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Motives behind M&A: A study of European Utilities 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: This study aims to investigate the motivation and post-merger operating 
performance of European utility sectors following mergers and acquisitions. 
  
Design/Methodology/Approach: Motives behind M&A is examined by looking into 
the relationships between total gains, target gains and acquirer gains. Post-merger 
operating performance is measured by comparing the the sample of European utilities 
with a matched portfolio based on size and market to book ratio with respect to five 
accounting indicators: growth in turnover, growth in earnings before interest and tax, 
return on assets, net profit margin and growth in fixed assets. 
 
Findings: Synergy is the primary motive for M&A in the European utility firms. This 
study also found that post-merger operating performance is negative and significant 
across all the five accounting indicators matched by size and market to book ratio 
suggesting that utility mergers underperform in the long-term. The findings suggest 
that gains accruing to utilities involved in acquisitions are short term in nature.  
 
Practical Implications: Negative post merger operating performance bears important 
policy implications as in future antitrust/competition authorities should be more 
vigilant before approving utility mergers.  
 
Originality/Value: Public utilities possess several characteristics that are different 
from industrial firms and therefore need to be examined separately. Empirical literature 
on mergers and acquisitions is very limited on utilities. This study has addressed this 
gap by examining the motivation and post-merger operating performance of the 
European utility firms. 
 
I. Introduction 
          Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have become popular means for firm growth 
and corporate restructuring (Uddin & Boateng, 2014). It is therefore not surprising that 
M&A have accelerated and have become a global phenomenon (Boateng, Wang and 
Yang, 2008; Nguyen, Yung and Sun, 2012). Over the last decade this trend has been 
increasingly observed in the European utilities sector. For example, from 2008 to 2010 
global top deals were predominantly headed by mergers in the utility sector and in 
2008 and 2009 more than eighty percent of utility mergers in Europe were from the 
utilities sector (ATKearney, 2017). One of the reasons for the surge in utilities M&A in 
Europe is due to fall in market capitalization of European utilities after 2008 due to 
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political and regulatory pressure. The second reason as reported by ATKearney (2017) 
is the availability of cheap finance from private equity and infrastructure funds. 
         Despite the growing trends of M&A, research evidence indicates that M&A 
generally fails to meet the anticipated goals in terms of profitability. Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1987); Tetenbaum (1999); Hudson and Barnfield (2001); Erez-Rein et al. 
(2004) point out that more than half of all M&A deals fail financially or destroy firm 
value for the acquiring firms. The intriguing question therefore is: if M&A activities do 
not create value, why do companies continue to engage in them? The paper attempts to 
answer this question and shed lights on the motives and performance of the European 
utility M&A.  
From a comprehensive review of literature on entry mode internationalization/ 
mergers and acquisitions and diversification, Reddy (2014) developed a synopsis of 17 
theories behind these corporate events. Yaghoubi, Yaghoubi, Locke and Gibb (2016a) 
and (2016b) undertook an extensive review of M&A literature to examine the gaps that 
have still remained in this area. The two part study reported that the sources of values 
in mergers and acquisitions are still unknown. Kinateder, Fabich and Wagner (2107) 
had examined domestic M&A in BRICs countries and reported positive and significant 
target shareholder returns in the announcement period. While a number of studies have 
examined the motivation and performance of M&A of publicly held industrial firms 
(see, Ghosh, 2001, 2004; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Zhang, 1998; Nguyen, Yung 
and Sun, 2012; Hodgkinson and Partington, 2008; Du, Boateng and Newton, 2015), the 
motivation and performance of acquisitions in utility firms have been ignored in the 
extant literature. Indeed, we know relatively little about what motivates acquisitions in 
the utilities sector and their performance. The lack of research in respect to the 
motivation and performance of utility acquisitions is a serious omission and ought to 
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be investigated. This is because public utilities possess several characteristics that are 
different from industrial firms. First, the regulatory environment faced by public 
utilities is different (Bertunek, Jessell and Madura, 1993). For example, the public 
utilities are extensively regulated by the governments in terms of their operations 
including the prices they charge for their services. Second, M&A in the utility sector 
are made more complicated and time consuming by the regulatory agencies. Although 
further liberalisation and deregulation of the utilities market in the UK and Continental 
Europe in the 1990s have reduced the government restrictions in most European 
countries in terms of control through the principle of golden shares (Dnes et al, 1998; 
Nestor, 2005), the regulatory agencies continue to make the takeover activities in 
utility market time consuming and difficult. Lastly, public utilities provide service that 
are essential for economic growth and development and are generally natural 
monopolies. The above characteristics such as regulatory pressures, pricing policies 
may impede acquisition transactions and reduce the gains accruing to M&A in the 
utility firms. Yet we have seen some high profile M&A transactions in this sector over 
the past two decades including Electricite de France (EDF)/Graninge in 1998, National 
Power/Calortex in 1999; National Grid Group/Lattice Group in 2002. Our next 
question is: how do these firms perform in the long run?   
We attempt to answer the question relating to the motivation by employing the 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) model that utilises short-term wealth effects to 
identify and separate different motives for acquisitions. To address the issue of 
performance, we compare the sample of European utilities with a matched portfolio 
comprising of companies in the same industry, size and market to book ratio. The 
results show that synergy is the primary motive behind M&A in the European utilities 
sector. Regarding the operating performance (OP), this study finds that post-merger 
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returns are negative and significant across all the five accounting indicators matched 
by industry, size and market to book ratio suggesting that utility mergers underperform 
and that synergies are not realised in the long-term. This paper contributes to M&A 
discourse by shedding lights on the reasons for acquisitions and the OP of the 
European utilities. We also show that the synergy motive that drives utility acquisitions 
is realised in the short-term but not in the long-term suggesting that gains accruing to 
utilities involved in acquisitions are short term in nature.  
          The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
regarding the motivation and performance of M&A. Following that section 3 presents 
the data and methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical findings and finally 
section 5 provides the conclusions and discusses the implications of the findings. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Wealth Gains and Motivation for M&A 
          Prior literature suggests that three main motives, namely, synergy, agency and 
hubris
1
 drive acquisitions and the effect of the wealth of bidders provides an indication 
of the motivation for M&A (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993, Seth et al, 2000; Roll, 
1986; Georgen and Renneboog, 2000, Nguyen, Yung and Sun, 2012). The studies by 
Sudarsanam et al.  (1996); Gupta et al (1997), Seth et al (2000), Delong (2001) and 
Houston et al (2001); suggest that if M&As are driven by the synergy motive then such 
acquisitions should be wealth enhancing. In similar vein, Berkovitch and Narayanan 
                                                
1
 The synergy hypothesis proposes that M&A take place when the value of the 
combined firm is greater than the sum of the values of the individual firms (see 
Bradley et al, 1988). Agency hypothesis suggests that managers of the acquiring firms 
engage in M&A in order to maximise their own self-interest at the expense of the 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hubris theory contend that there are no 
gains from M&A and takeovers take place due to acquirer managers’ 
overconfidence/mistakes in estimating the potential gains from M&A (Roll, 1986). 
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(1993), Gupta et al (1997), Seth et al (2000), Georgen and Renneboog (2004) and 
Hodgkinson and Partington (2008) looked into the relationship between the combined 
gains, target gains and acquirer gains as motives behind M&A and found agency and 
hubris motives to be important drivers for M&A. Roll (1986) point out that, if large 
gains accrue to target shareholders and small returns (or in some cases, negative but 
statistically insignificant returns) to the acquiring firms, it provide evidence to acquirer 
that the acquisition is not wealth creating. In such cases, Roll (1986) argues that an 
acquisition that was initiated on a basis of synergy may be consummated on the basis 
of hubris. Supporting this line of thinking, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) note that, 
even if, the total gain is positive for a sample of takeovers, the acquirer gains might be 
negative for many of the firms in the sample and studies should allow for such 
combination to be evaluated.  
          The table below summarises the relation between the target and total gain; 
acquirer and total gain as hypothesised by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993). 
 
[Insert Table 1 here please] 
 
          It is pertinent to note that Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) model above has 
been used by several studies both in US and Europe (e.g. Gupta et al, 1997; Zhang, 
1998; Seth et al, 2000; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004 and Hodgkinson and Partington, 
2008) to analyse the motivation for M&A. While these studies have reported that 
synergy is the predominant motive behind M&A, some of these studies have also 
reported the presence of agency or hubris or both in varying degrees in the culmination 
of such purposes. This suggests that M&As are not motivated by a single reason and 
this conclusion is consistent with the findings of Boateng, Wang and Yang (2008) who 
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found that Chinese M&As are driven by a set of multiple motives. However, none of 
these studies have examined motives behind M&A in regulated
2
 industries and that is 
the subject of this paper. 
 
2.2 Operating Performance 
         Previous studies have examined M&A performance from the perspectives of two 
time horizons, namely, short-run performance and long-run performance. Studies in 
respect of short-term performance use share-price information to examine wealth gains 
following acquisition announcement while both share price information and accounting 
based measures such as return of assets are used to evaluate the long-run performance 
of merging firms. In the context of M&A of utility sectors, short term performance and 
long-term abnormal returns have been examined by Datta et al. (2013) and they 
reported positive target gains and negative acquirer gains where both the gains to target 
firms and losses to acquirer firms were lower in absolute terms in comparison to non-
regulated sectors. Datta et al. (2013) also reported negative post-merger abnormal 
returns in the three-year period following the completion of M&A. All of these studies 
have focused on the motives of M&A in the energy sector and on individual countries 
within Europe. It is important, however, to point out that the study by Datta et al. 
(2013) did not examine the OP of M&A but suggested that future research on M&A in 
the utilities sector should look into post-merger OP using accounting based measures. 
Responding to this call, this study investigates the OP of European utilities. Due to the 
dearth of research, we review the OP for industrial firms.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
                                                
2
 All companies are subjected to some form of regulation. Here regulated industries refer to those 
industries that are subjected to economic regulation like price-cap regulation in the UK and rate of return 
regulation in the US in the context of utility sectors. 
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Sharma and Ho (2002) have done a comprehensive review of literature on post-merger 
OP and reported mixed results. We have done a similar review of studies post 2000 
(for studies before 2000, see Sharma and Ho, 2002) and this is shown in table 2. The 
review of studies in table 2 suggests mixed evidences on post-merger OP. For instance, 
Reddy, Nangia and Agrawal (2013), Linn and Switzer (2001), Heron and Lie (2002), 
Rahman and Limmack (2004) and Kruse et al (2007) have reported increase in post 
merger OP. These results are also evidenced in earlier literatures like Healy et al 
(1992) and Cornett and Tegranian (1992).  On the other hand Ravenscraft and Scherer 
(1987), Yeh and Hoshino (2002), Mantravadi and Reddy (2008) and Bertrand and 
Betschinger (2012) have reported losses and Ghosh (2001), Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2004), Sharma and Ho (2002), Powell and Stark (2005), Martynova et al (2007), Dutta 
and Jog (2009) Kumar (2009) and Rao and Nicholson (2016) have reported 
insignificant changes in post merger OP. None of the studies in table 2 have examined 
post merger OP in utilities sector. Datta et al. (2013) noted that “Utility sectors are 
indispensable and bear significant social welfare characteristics, so it is vital to 
examine whether the market’s perception of M&As within such sectors is any different 
from that in non-regulated industries. Moreover utility sectors are characterized by 
natural monopoly with significant economies of scale and scope.” In this context, this 
study aims to address the gap by examining post-merger OP of European utility 
sectors. 
 
 3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
           M&A data was taken from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database for over 
20 years period from 1990 to 2012. The rationale for selecting this time period is that 
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the European utilities engaged in M&A on a significant scale after the structural 
changes of privatization, liberalization and deregulation that took place in the early 
1990s (Armstrong et al, 1994). The sample comprises of completed deals and publicly 
listed targets in Europe and non-European countries. The acquirer consists of European 
companies in one of the four utility industries namely, electricity, gas, water and 
telecommunications. For the post-merger OP, this study looks at combined entities 
listed in one of the European stock exchanges. In addition, we selected deals where the 
percentage of shares owned after transaction by the acquirers is more than 50%. Data 
on market value, net profit margin, return on assets, earnings before interest and tax, 
market to book value, turnover, and fixed assets for both the sample and the control 
firms were obtained from Datastream database. 
        Based on the above criteria, a total of 172 M&A in the European utilities sector 
were obtained. The distribution of M&A in table 3 shows that 50% of M&A has taken 
place in the electricity sector followed by 34% in telecom, 11% in water and 5% in 
gas. In addition, more than half of the deals in our sample were from UK, Spanish and 
German companies as shown in table 3. For evaluating motives behind M&A we 
needed data for both the targets and acquirers as well as combined firm after the 
merger. This reduced our final sample to 75. 
(Insert Table 3 here please) 
3.2 Measurement of short-run stock price performance 
 
          In order to calculate the target gains, acquirer gains and total gains (shown in 
section 3.3), this study first evaluates the average abnormal returns (ARs) and average 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) by employing event study analysis. The efficient 
market hypothesis posits that in the absence of any event announcement, the securities 
are expected to earn normal returns. So presence of abnormal movements in share 
Page 8 of 38
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijpsm
International Journal of Public Sector Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Public Sector M
anagem
ent 9
prices following the announcement of an event (in this case announcement of M&As) 
reflects the impact of the announcement of the event on the security returns.  
          Brown and Warner (1980) posit that a security price performance can be shown 
as ‘abnormal’ when it is compared to a benchmark (normal returns). The abnormal 
return is the difference between actual ex-post return of the security that is obtained 
over the event window and the normal or expected return of the firm that is obtained 
from the estimation window.  
         In this study we use OLS market model as benchmark to calculate the normal 
returns, since it is ‘relatively powerful’ and ‘well specified’ under a variety of 
conditions (Brown and Warner, 1985). 
The OLS market model benchmark is expressed as follows: 
Ri,t =αi +βiRm,t +εi,t                                                                            (1) 
          In equation 1, Ri,t , Rm,t are the rate of return for security i on day t and rate of 
return for market index
3
 on day t, respectively. The expected return E(Ri,t )under the 
OLS market model is expressed as follows: 
tmti RRE ,,
ˆˆ)( βα +=                                                                            (2) 
          In equation 2, the estimates ofαi and βi , which are αˆ  and βˆ are obtained by 
regressing security returns tiR ,  on the market return tmR , over the estimation window. 
The abnormal return for firm i at event date t is expressed as follows: 
ARi,t = Ri,t −E(Ri,t )                                                                             (3) 
          In equation 3, Ri,t is the actual return of i
th
 firm on the event day t and E(Ri,t )is 
the normal benchmark return obtained from OLS market model. Equation 4 shows the 
                                                
3
 . Since the sample of firms comes from different European countries, so for each country their 
respective market indices have been used as a proxy for the market return Rm,t . 
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cumulative abnormal return for firm i over the 21 days event window (-10, +10). This 
is shown below. 
CAR−10,10
i = ARi,t
t1
t2
∑ ,                                                                           (4) 
          Following Collins and Dent (1984) and Brown and Warner (1985) this study has 
used the time series standard deviation test as the test statistic to examine the statistical 
significance of ARi,t and CAR−10,10
i . 
3.3 Measurement of motives behind M&A by examining: Combined gains 
i
etGainT arg is the gain (or loss) accrued to the ith target firm shareholders and 
i
inAcquirerGa  is the gain (or loss) accrued to the shareholders of the ith acquirer firm.  
T argetGaini =MVT arget
i *CART arget
i (−10,+10)                                    (5) 
AcquirerGaini =MVAcquirer
i *CARAcquirer
i (−10,+10)                             (6) 
TotalGaini = T argetGaini + AcquirerGaini                                       (7)               
i
etTMV arg  and 
i
AcquirerMV  
are the market capitalisation of the i
th
 target firm and i
th
 
acquirer firm respectively. All the market capitalisations are expressed in British pound 
sterling. The total gains are reported in millions
4
. Wilcoxon
5
 ranked test was carried 
out to determine whether the median total gain is statistically greater than zero.  
3.4 Measurement of motives: Target gain, Acquirer gain and Total gain 
          Following Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and Seth et al (2000), this study 
examined the relation between target gains, total gains and acquirer gains by the 
following equations. 
Target gain = α + ß*Total gain                                                          (8) 
                                                
4 Seth et al (2000) have termed this as dollar gains since in their studies the total gains were reported in 
US dollars. 
5
 Wilcoxon signed rank test is a non-parametric equivalent of t-test. It is used when the distributional 
assumptions that underlie t-test is not satisfied. This test is used in several extant studies to determine the 
statistical significance of the median  
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Target gain = α + ß*Acquirer gain                                                    (9) 
From the definition of synergy, agency and hubris (see footnote 1) the following 
hypotheses have been developed. 
H1a: M&A of European utilities are motivated by synergy. This would imply positive 
total gain and positive ß coefficients in equations 8 and 9. 
H1b: M&A of European utilities are motivated by agency. This would imply negative 
total gain and negative ß coefficients in equations 8 and 9. 
H1c: M&A of European utilities are motivated by hubris. This would imply zero total 
gain and zero ß coefficient in equations 8. 
To determine if synergy and hubris hypotheses co-exist in the positive total gain
6
 
subsample the following equation has been analysed following, Seth et al (2000). 
Target gain = α + ß1Acquirer gain + ß2 (Acquirer gain*Dummy)     (10) 
Dummy
7
 = 0 if acquirer gain is positive and 1 if acquirer gain is negative. If ß1+ ß2 is 
negative in the negative acquirer gain subsample this would imply simultaneous 
presence of synergy and hubris (since equation 10 is examined only on positive total 
gain subsample and hence synergy motive has already been established). 
 
3.5 Measurement of operating performance  
         As evidenced in table 2 most of the empirical studies have either used a change 
model or regression model using various benchmark and control variables. This study 
has used the change model
8
 that is considered superior to the regression model (see 
Healy et al, 1992). Following Barber and Lyon (1996) and Loughran and Ritter (1997) 
                                                
6
By definition, synergy motive will be present only in the positive total gain subsample.  
7 Dummy variable differentiates the firms with positive acquirer gain to firms with negative acquirer 
gain. ß1 measures the relation between target and acquirer gain in positive acquirer gain subsample while 
ß1+ ß2 measure the same in the negative acquirer group subsample. 
8
 Ghosh (2001) and Powell and Stark (2005) maintained that regression based methodology may provide 
biased results where acquirers differ from control firms on traits that govern future profits. 
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excess OP
9
 is the difference between OP of a utility company following M&A and the 
mean OP of a benchmark-portfolio comprised of firms that did not engage in M&A 
with similar size and market to book value ratio during the month of M&A completion. 
         This study has used five accounting indicators of OP, which are Growth of 
Turnover, Growth of Earnings before Interest and Tax (EBIT)
10
, Return on Assets 
(ROA)
11
, Net Profit Margin (NPM)
12
 and Growth in Fixed Assets
13
. The three 
indicators of OP, Turnover, EBIT and Fixed Assets are examined using the change 
models, while the other two ROA and NPM are examined using level models. These 
are shown in table 4. 
(Insert Table 4 here please) 
         The abnormal operating performance defined earlier is expressed as follows: 
j
titi
L
ti CPPAOP ,,, −=                                                                            (11) 
          In equation 11, 
tiP ,  is the level of operating performance of the sample utility 
company i at time period t; jtiCP ,  is the mean level of operating performance of the 
matching portfolio for firm i at time t and j refers to different comparison groups used 
in this study, j=1,2 (1=size, 2=market to book ratio). LtiAOP , is the abnormal OP of firm 
i at time t. 
                                                
9 Extant literature documents that evaluation of operating performance of sample firms with matched 
controlled firms can be affected not only by the takeover but also by a host of other factors (see Sharma 
and Ho, 2002). This problem has been addressed by selecting those control firms that were not engaged 
in M&A over 3 year period before the acquisition as recommended by Barber and Lyon (1996) and 
Loughran and Ritter (1997). 
10
 This study has taken Earnings before Interest and Tax (EBIT) as proxy for cash flow. 
11
 Return on Assets (ROA) is defined as EBT divided by total book value of assets. 
12
 NPMi,t  is  defined as the relationship between the level of annual EBT and Turnover for firm i at time 
t. 
13
 Jung et al (1996) in the context of equity issuance has measured Growth in Fixed Assets as a proxy for 
managerial overconfidence. Following similar argument it can be postulated that if sample firms’ growth 
in fixed assets are lower than control benchmark-portfolio then hubris or managerial overconfidence can 
be concluded as one of the motives behind M&A. 
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         The abnormal ‘change type’ OP for equity issuers is defined as the difference 
between the annual changes in the operating performance of the sample firm and that 
of the matching portfolio: 
 
j
titij
ti
j
ti
j
ti
ti
titiC
ti CPP
CP
CPCP
P
PP
AOP ,,
1,
1,,
,
1,,
, ∆−∆=
−
−
−
=
−−
−−
                         (12) 
C
tiAOP , is the abnormal OP of firm i at time t; tiP ,  and 1, −tiP are the performance of 
sample firms at time t and t-1 respectively and jtiCP ,  and
j
tiCP 1, − denote the performance 
of control portfolio for firm i at time t and t-1 respectively. The estimation of statistical 
significance of the median-operating performance difference between sample of M&A 
in the utilities sector and matching portfolio is verified by calculating Wilcoxon 
signed-rank sum test.          
          The review of studies in table 2 shows mixed evidences of OP under both cash 
flow and earnings based measures of performance. The following hypotheses have 
been developed in the context of post-merger OP.  
H2a: Post-merger OP growth in turnover is lower than that of the control portfolio. 
H2b: EBIT of sample utility firms is lower than that of the control portfolio. 
H2c: ROA of sample utility firms is lower than that of the control portfolio. 
H2d: Net profit margin of sample utility firms is lower than that of the control 
portfolio. 
H2e: OP measured in terms of growth in fixed assets is lower than that of the control 
portfolio. 
 
4. Results & Discussion 
4.1 Results on short run announcement period performance 
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          Panel A of tables 5 and 6 show the mean abnormal returns and average 
cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirer firms. The results show that acquirer 
shareholders have earned negative abnormal returns following M&A announcement 
and most of these are significant at one percent level. On the other hand the target 
shareholders have earned positive announcement period returns and again these results 
are significant at one percent level. These results are consistent with empirical 
evidences obtained in other non-utility sectors. Positive target returns have also been 
reported by Kinateder et al. (2017). In addition, consistent with Datta et al. (2013), this 
study showed that target gains were far lower than that reported in non-regulated 
sectors. Datta et al. (2013) attributed this to the fact that public utilities are local 
monopolies and remain on the regulatory and political radar that lowers risk and also 
generates a low stable stream of revenue.  
(Insert Tables 5 and 6 here please) 
 
4.2 Motives for Utilities M&A 
          The results from combined gain shown in table 7 indicate that synergy is the 
predominant motive behind M&As of European utilities. This is evidenced by positive 
median combined gain in the eleven days event window surrounding the 
announcement date and this is significant at five percent.  Synergy is also confirmed by 
the evidence that 61% of total gain is positive.  
(Insert Table 7 here please) 
          Panel A of table 8 provides the results of the regression, target gain = α + ß*total 
gain, for the entire sample as well as for the subsample of positive and negative total 
gain. For the full sample ß is positive (0.092, t = 3.6) and significant at 1%. ß is also 
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positive (0.37, t = 5.9) and significant in the positive total gain subsample. The result in 
table 7 and panel 8 of table support the hypothesis H1a.  
(Insert Table 8 here please) 
          Panel B of table 8 shows no statistically significant relation between target gain 
and acquirer gain and hence cannot lend support to any of the hypotheses in section 
3.4.  
          None of the ß coefficients of panel B of table 8 are statistically significant. 
Hence simultaneous presence of synergy and hubris cannot be confirmed.  
          Since hypothesis 1a is accepted, which implies synergy motive, it suggests that 
M&A in utility sectors occur to generate efficiency, particularly, operating efficiency. 
The finding that synergy motive drives utility M&As may be explained by the 
deregulation which occurred in 1990s. Deregulation allows the removal of barriers to 
merger thereby facilitating the speed of merger transaction leading to cost reduction at 
given point in time (static synergy). Another plausible explanation for this finding may 
be due to the pooling of management resources (one head office instead of two), 
achieving revenue enhancement through marketing and purchasing synergies (greater 
bargaining power), economies of scale in production leading to cost reductions, and 
avoidance of duplication of production and other activities.  
 
4.3 Operating Performance 
         The results in table 9 suggest that post-merger OP is negative and significant 
across all the five accounting indicators matched by industry, size and book to market 
ratio. This lends support to all our hypotheses from 2a to 2e. The results suggest that 
although synergy has been found as the predominant motive behind M&A of the 
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sample of European utilities however the synergy gains have not been realised in the 
long-term post-merger period.  
 
[Insert Table 9 please] 
 
         These results are consistent with Becker-Blease et al (2008) and Datta et al. 
(2013) who reported negative post-merger abnormal returns using Buy and Hold 
Abnormal Returns technique (BHAR) in utility sectors. This result is also consistent 
with extant literature in other sectors that are reviewed in table 2. The negative post-
merger OP can also be attributed to the lack of prior experience of the European 
companies to operate and integrate with other utilities. This point has also been raised 
by Datta et al. (2013), Bertunek et al (1993) and Ray and Thompson (1990).  
 
5. Conclusion  
         The aim of this study was to examine the motives and post-merger OP of M&As 
of European utilities. Two different methods have been applied to determine the 
motives behind M&A. The results from the combined gain method reported that the 
mean total CAR is positive and statistically significant suggesting that synergy motive 
drives M&A in the utility sector. The presence of synergy is also reinforced in the 
regression results that show a significant positive correlation between target gain and 
total gain for the entire sample as well as in the subsample of positive total gain. The 
synergy motive might have emanated from deregulation that removed the barriers for 
the utility companies to enable these firms to embark on takeovers at relatively lower 
transaction costs as argued by Leggio and Lien (2000) and Becker-Blease et al. (2008).  
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         The results of post-merger operating performance however reveal that synergy 
gains have not been realized by the sample of utility companies in the three-year post-
merger period following M&A. The negative post-merger operating performance is 
consistent with the findings of Datta et al. (2013) following M&A of European utilities 
and Becker-Blease et al. (2008) in the context of M&A of the US electricity sector. 
Both of these studies reported negative long run post-merger shareholder returns. 
           The negative post-merger operating performance might suggest that if synergies 
existed in M&A of utilities they were passed to other industry stakeholders. For 
instance, if mergers bring in lower prices, then that might be beneficial to consumers. 
However further research is required to support this argument in the context of M&As 
of European utility sectors.  
            The poor post-merger OP of the utility sectors could also be due to the 
characteristics of the utility sectors themselves. Utility sectors are marked by some 
distinct economic characteristics (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Armstrong et al., 1994). 
Most of these sectors supply their end product through a fixed network and are often 
labelled as network industries with low price elasticity. Many aspects of these sectors 
like transmission and distribution have natural monopoly conditions like the costs of 
wires (for fixed line telephones and electricity) and pipelines (for gas and water) are 
sunk costs and it would be inefficient to have competing networks. Armstrong et al. 
(1994) postulated that duplication of these networks would be a wasteful expenditure 
for the economy. From our results it can be interpreted that although synergy motive 
has been identified as the cause of these mergers but the unique characteristics of these 
sectors, particularly the natural monopoly feature, did not lead to post merger synergy 
in terms of positive post-merger OP.  
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            Negative post merger operating performance signals that utilities M&As could 
have a potential detrimental effect upon maintenance of standards of performance and 
appropriate investment in infrastructure improvement.  Hence it bears important policy 
implications as in future antitrust/competition authorities should be more vigilant 
before approving utility mergers. Overall the findings of this study have significant 
policy implications both from the perspective of corporate governance and economic 
regulations.  
                Moreover, it is important to point out that the focus of this paper was to 
examine three main motives and how they influence operating performance rather than 
the general motives of M&A hence readers should bear this in mind in their 
interpretation of the results. We suggest that, future studies in utility sector should 
utilise all motives for M&As to provide a more holistic understanding of the reasons 
for utility M&As. 
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Table 1 
Relationship between the Target and Total gain; Acquirer and Total gain 
 Target gain and total 
gain 
Target gain and acquirer 
gain 
Efficiency or synergy + + 
Hubris (winner’s curse, 
overpay) 
0 - 
Agency or Managerialism - - 
 Source: Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) 
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Table 2 
Study; 
sample 
period 
Market 
Sample 
size 
Control 
Accounting 
measures 
Statistics 
used 
Increase or decrease post 
operating performance 
              
Rao-
Nicholson 
(2016); 
2001-2012 
ASEAN 
countries 
57 
Industry, size 
and pre-
performance 
ROA, Sales 
margin,  
Change and 
Regression 
No significant change 
Reddy et al 
(2013); 
2000-2005  
India 
Small 
sample 
Industry 
Profitability, 
Financial 
Structure, 
Liquidity, 
Turnover, Market 
Growth and 
Valuation Ratios 
Cylinder 
model 
Superior performance in the 
post-merger period for both 
manufacturing and services 
sectors 
Bertrand 
and 
Betschinger 
(2012), 
1999-2008 
Russia 609 
Non-acquiring 
firm 
Pre-tax cash 
flow/BV assets 
Other Decrease 
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Papadakis 
and Thanos 
(2010); 
1997-2003 
Greece 50 Industry ROA/BV Change No significant change 
Kumar 
(2009); 
1999-2002 
India 30 Industry 
Combined 
measure of pre-
merger 
profitability, 
asset turnover 
and solvency 
Change 
model 
No change 
Dutta and 
Jog (2009); 
1993-2002 
Canada 1300 
Industry, size 
and pre-
performance 
Pre-tax cash 
flow/BV of assets 
Change and 
Regression 
No significant change 
Pillania et 
al (2008); 
2003 
India 74 None 
Working capital, 
Operating profit, 
Profit before tax, 
ROE, EPS,  debt 
to equity ratios 
Change Increase 
Mantravadi 
and Reddy 
(2008); 
1991-2003 
India 118 None 
6 different 
financial and 
operating ratios 
Change Decrease 
Yen and 
Andre 
(2007); 
1997-2001 
11 
countries 
287 
Industry, Size 
ROA 
Pre-tax operating 
cash flow 
(EBITDA) 
Regression, 
change 
model 
Non-linear relationship between 
concentrated ownership and 
post-acquisition operating 
performance 
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Kruse et al 
(2007) 
Japan 69 Industry, size 
Pre-tax cash 
flow/MV, Pre-tax 
cash flow/ assets 
Change Increase 
Martynova 
et al 
(2007); 
1997-2001 
Europe 155 
Industry, size 
and pre-
performance 
Adjusted Pre-tax 
cash flow/BV of 
assets; Adjusted 
Pre-tax cash 
flow/Sales 
Change and 
Regression 
No significant change 
Pazarkis et 
al (2006); 
1998-2000 
Greece 50 None 
Profitability, 
Liquidity and 
Solvency Ratios 
Change Decrease 
Cosh et al 
(2006); 
1985-1996 
UK 363 
Industry and 
profitability 
Profit by book 
assets, profit by 
sales, profit by 
market value, 
cash flow by 
book assets, cash 
flow by sales, 
cash flow by 
market value of 
assets 
Change 
model 
Positive relationship between 
CEO ownership and post 
takeover performance. 
Powell and 
Stark 
(2005); 
1985-1993 
UK 191 
Industry median 
and firms 
matched on 
industry, size 
and pre-
operating 
performance 
Operating cash 
flow and pre-
depreciation 
profit 
Regression No significant change 
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characteristics. 
Rahman 
and 
Limmack 
(2004); 
1988-1992 
Malaysia 
94 
acquirer 
firms 
and 113 
target 
firms 
Industry 
matched for 
complete sample 
and size 
matched for 
acquirer firms 
Ratio of 
operating cash 
flow to operating 
assets 
Regression 
and Change 
Increase 
Yeh and 
Hoshino 
(2002); 
1970-1974 
Japan 86 Industry 
ROA, ROE, 
Sales growth, 
Employment 
Growth 
Other Decrease 
Heron and 
Lie (2002); 
1985-1997 
US 859 
Industry 
adjusted 
Operating 
Income/Sales 
Change and 
Regression 
Increase 
Sharma and 
Ho (2002); 
1986-1991 
Australia 36 
Industry and 
asset size 
ROA, ROE, 
profit margin, 
cash flow/sales, 
EPS, cash 
flow/no. of 
shares, cash 
flow/total assets, 
cash 
flow/average 
shareholders 
Change and 
Regression 
No significant change 
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equity 
Ghosh 
(2001); 
1981-1995 
US 135 
Industry, Size, 
pre-performance 
industry 
Pre-tax cash 
flow/MV of 
assets 
Change and 
Regression 
No significant change 
Pawasker 
(2001); 
1992-1995 
India 36 Industry, size 
Pre-tax cash 
flow/Net assets 
Other Decrease 
Linn and 
Switzer 
(2001); 
1967-1987 
US 413 Industry 
Pre-tax cash 
flow/MV of 
assets 
Change Increase 
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Table 3 
Distribution of M&A of European utility companies across different utility sectors and 
country of the acquirer firms 
Country\Sector Electricity Gas Water Telecom Total 
Belgium 3       3 
Denmark       3 3 
France 2   12 4 18 
Finland 7     3 10 
Germany 23 2   3 28 
Greece       1 1 
Italy 2     6 8 
Netherlands       1 1 
Norway       1 1 
Portugal 2       2 
Russian Fed 2     2 4 
Spain 26 1 1 10 38 
Sweden 2     7 9 
Switzerland 1     4 5 
UK 16 6 6 13 41 
Total 86 9 19 58 172 
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Table 4: Models of abnormal operating performance  
This table reports the models of expected operating performance and the related accounting measures. 
Following Barber and Lyon (1996), the operating performance are estimated using both ‘level’ and ‘change’ 
type models that measures the performance differential between sample M&A European utilities and 
corresponding control benchmark portfolio. Models 1,2,3 are used to capture relative annual changes in 
operating performance for the sample M&A or
j
titi
C
ti CPPAOP ,,, ∆−∆= ; where 
C
tiAOP , is the abnormal 
operating performance for sample firm i at time t-1 to t=0 and 
j
tiCP ,∆ is the annual change in operating 
performance for control portfolio benchmark group j=1,2,3 that represent size, market to book value and 
industry respectively. Similarly, models 4,5,6, measure the difference between level of operating performance at 
discrete times between sample European utilities and corresponding matching portfolio groups, j=1,2,3.  
 
Panel A Models of abnormal operating performance 
Model Models of excess operating performance Comparison groups 
1 
Difference between annual change in sample firms' 
performance and the annual change in matching size portfolio 
benchmark  
2 
 
Difference between annual change in sample firms' 
performance and the annual change in matching market to 
book portfolio benchmark  
3 
 
Difference between annual change in sample firms' 
performance and the annual change in industry performance 
4 
 
Level difference to matching size portfolio 
 
5 Level difference to matching market to book portfolio 
6 
 
 
Level difference to industry performance 
Panel B Accounting measures of operating performance 
Accounting indicators Description 
Growth of Turnover 
Growth is measured in terms of increase in the reported 
turnover between t-1 and t=0, or  
1
,,, titi
L
ti CPPAOP −=
2
,,, titi
L
ti CPPAOP −=
3
,,, titi
L
ti CPPAOP −=
2
,,, titi
C
ti CPPAOP ∆−∆=
3
,,, titi
C
ti CPPAOP ∆−∆=
1
,,, titi
C
ti CPPAOP ∆−∆=
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Growth in Earnings before Interest and Tax 
This is measured as the increase in the reported earnings after 
interest and before tax figures between t-1 and t=0 or ∆EBTi,t 
= (EBITi,t -EBITi,t-1)/EBITi,t-1 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Defined as the EBTi,t  divided by the book value of assets of 
company i at time t, or ROAi,t =EBTi,t/BVi, t 
Net profit margin 
Defined as the ratio of the annual EBT and the level of 
Turnover for firm i at time t 
Growth in Fixed Assets 
Increase in the reported total fixed assets of company i 
between time t-1 and t=0 
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Table 5 Average abnormal return of the acquirer and target firms based on the OLS 
market model benchmark 
This table reports the average AR for the entire sample of completed mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of the 
European utilities from 1990 to 2012. Panels A and B reports the eleven days acquirer AARs and target AARs 
surrounding the event date respectively.  The AARs are calculated for 150 acquirer firms and 144 target firms 
whose stock prices were available. The OLS market model is expressed as follows: 
titmiiti RR ,,, εβα ++=  
tmR , is the return on the equally weighted market portfolio on day t; tiR ,  is the return for security i on day t. In 
the OLS market model the expected return for each security for both the target and acquirer portfolios are 
obtained by estimating αi and βi .  This is done by regressing security returns tiR ,  on the market return tmR , for 
the estimation period. The expected return )( ,tiRE under the OLS market model is given by
tmti RRE ,,
ˆˆ)( βα += . The abnormal returns for each security are calculated as follows: 
)( ,,, tititi RERAR −= . The average abnormal returns is calculated as follows: Average ARt =
1
n
ARi,t
i=1
n
∑ . 
The significance of the abnormal returns is tested by t-statistic.  ** indicates significance at 1% level. The fifth 
column shows the percentage of abnormal returns that were positive on each day in the 11 days event window. 
Panel A: Acquirer mean AR based on OLS market model 
Day N AR  t- statistic %(+) 
-5 150 -0.016** -7.18 42 
-4 150 -0.018** -7.97 43 
-3 150 0.0003 0.39 47 
-2 150 -0.002 -0.83 45 
-1 150 -0.001** -0.65 47 
0 150 -0.006** -2.52 53 
1 150 0.002** 0.92 60 
2 150 0.001 0.37 55 
3 150 -0.001 -0.31 57 
4 150 -0.0004 -0.20 55 
5 150 -0.0016 -0.75 52 
 Panel B: Target mean AR based on OLS market model  
Day N AAR  t- statistic %(+) 
-5 144 -0.0012 -0.45 37 
-4 144 0.001 0.43 60 
-3 144 0.0075** 2.79 56 
-2 144 0.0089** 3.31 55 
-1 144 0.0111** 4.13 59 
0 144 0.054*** 5.17 66 
1 144 0.012** 4.47 37 
2 144 0.0019 0.69 47 
3 144 0.0027 1.01 54 
4 144 0.0017 0.62 55 
5 144 -0.0040 -1.51 55 
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Table 6 Average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of the acquirer and target firms based on the OLS 
market model benchmark 
This table reports the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of the portfolio of acquirer (Panel A) and 
target firms (Panel B) for different event windows. The average CAR represents the entire sample of completed 
M&A of the European utility companies from 1990 to 2012. The M&A announcements are identified from SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database. The average CAR for an event window (t1, t2) is given as follows: 
CAR−10,10
i = ARi,t
t1
t2
∑ . The significance of average CAR is tested by t-test. *and ** indicates the significance at 
5% and 1% respectively.   
 
 
Panel A: Acquirer average CAR based on OLS market model 
Interval CAAR t-statistic 
(-10,+10) -0.14** -2.9 
(-5,+5) -0.006** -6.05 
(-1,+1) -0.005** -3.8 
(0,+1) -0.004* -2.25 
(-1,0) -0.007** -4.5 
0 -0.006* -2.52 
Panel B: Target average CAR based on OLS market model 
Interval CAAR t-statistic 
(-10,+10) 0.094** 6.24 
(-5,+5) 0.086** 7.9 
(-1,+1) 0.076** 8.8 
(0,+1) 0.065** 3.9 
(-1,0) 0.064** 3.5 
0 0.053** 2.6 
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Table 7: Total gain over the event window  (-10,+10)  
Gain to  Mean Median Min  Max %Positive 
Total   -106.40 46.09 -28591.5 10493.23 61 
     (-0.207**)   (1.47*) 
  
  
Target 303.61  20.29 -1006.2 7444.49 68 
  (-2.52)   (-2.85**) 
  
  
Acquirer -410.02 0.003 -27585.31 9885.73 51 
  (-0.87) (1.2) 
  
  
Combined gain as 
%of pre-offer 
market value of 
target and 
acquirer firms 
-0.007% 0.01 -1.06 0.20 61 
  (-0.43)         
To evaluate combined gains both the target and acquirer returns are required for an individual deal. So only 
those pair of deals were taken where both the target and acquirer share price were available. This has reduced 
the number of deal size to 75.  
Note: * denotes statistical significance at 5 percent level and ** denotes significance at 1% 
Mean and median in £ million; (N=75) 
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Table 8 Relation between target/total gain and target/acquirer gain 
Notes:** denotes significant at 1%; and *significant at5% 
 
Sample  Size α ß F R
2
   
Panel A: Target gain =α + ß(Total gain)             
Full Sample 75 322.4** 0.092** 12.7 0.15   
  2.9 3.6   
Positive Total gain subsample 46 74.85 0.370** 34.61** 0.458   
  0.48 5.9   
Negative Total gain subsample 29 85.96 0.024 1.712 0.064   
  0.75 1.3   
Panel B: Relationship between Target and Acquirer gains           
Sample  Size α ß1 ß2 F R
2
 
Full Sample: Target gain =α + ß1(Acquirer gain)  75 339.17** 0.04 _ 1.97 0.028 
  2.7 1.4   
Positive Total gain subsample: Target gain = α + 
ß1(Acquirer gain) + ß2 (Acquirer gain) 46 370.47 0.137 134.73 0.663 0.032 
  1.5 1.2 0.29   
Negative Total gain subsample: Target gain =α + 
ß1(Acquirer gain)  29 69.450 0.016 _ 0.674 0.026 
    0.590 0.82       
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Table 9 Post merger abnormal operating performance for the sample of utility firms 
  Industry-matched Size-matched B/M Matched 
Growth in Turnover (A∆Ti,t
C
= ∆Ti,t-∆T
J
i,t) 
t=0 -9.21%(10.5**) -9.15%(10.6**) -9.76%(10.46**) 
t+6 -5.43%(11.19**) -5.72%(11.25**) -5.88%(15.17**) 
t+12 -4.43%(11.32**) -4.26%(11.55**) -4.80%(11.25**) 
t+18 -5.37%(12.08**) -5.43%(12.24**) -5.67%(11.14**) 
t+24 -7.32%(12.89**) -7.24%(12.92**) -7.48%(12.9**) 
t+30 -10.41%(11.20) -10.28%(11.17**) -10.57%(11.8**) 
t+36 -13.28%(11.10) -13.12%(11.04**) -13.36%(11.08**) 
Growth in 
Earnings Before 
Tax (A∆EBT
C
i,t= EBTi,t -EBTT
J
i,t ) 
t=0 -3.68%(11.56**) -3.52%(11.39**) -3.87%(12.20**) 
t+6 -4.38%(12.39**) -4.46%(12.35**) -4.4%(16.28**) 
t+12 -2.39%(12.81**) -2.35%(12.83**) -2.3%(13.4**) 
t+18 -3.35%(12.06**) -3.36%(12.02**) -3.4%(12.58**) 
t+24 -2.50%*(11.92**) -2.47%(11.96**) -2.5%(11.38**) 
t+30 -3.40%(11.38**) -3.45%(11.46**) -3.6%(12.8**) 
t+36 -7.26%(13.01**) -7.98%(12.99**) -7.5%(13.9**) 
Net Profit Margin (A∆NPM
C
i,t= ∆NPMi,t -NPM
J
i,t) 
t=0 -4.72%(10.66**) -4.78%(10.76**) -4.44% (10.23**) 
t+6 -2.3%(11.30**) -2.1%(9.29**) -1.7%(14.31**) 
t+12 -5.18%(10.66**) -5.14%(10.61**) -5.2%(10.77**) 
t+18 -4.73%(10.05**) -4.67%(9.98**) -4.12%(11.10) 
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t+24 -5.78%(11.15**) -5.56%(9.68**) -5.9%(11.07) 
t+30 -1.75%(12.23**) -1.67%(11.54**) -1.5%(12.33**) 
t+36 -2.85%(9.89**) -2.76%(10.01**) -2.9%(9.71**) 
Return on Assets 
   t=0 -33.17%(10.56**) -32.13%(10.61**) -32.63% (10.53**) 
t+6 -37.45%(10.66**) -37.24%(10.76**) -37.8%(14.8**) 
t+12 -34.8%(11.85**) -34.7%(11.96**) -38.4%(10.78**) 
t+18 -27.18%(10.91**) -27.12%(10.84**) -27.2%(11.17**) 
t+24 -37.76%(11.56**) -37.96%(11.77**) -37.23%(11.06**) 
t+30 -35.34%(11.20**) -35.24%(11.26**) -35.4%(11.46**) 
t+36 -20.16%(10.45**) -20.19%(12.06**) -20.13%(9.80**) 
Growth in Fixed 
Assets 
   t=0 -231.6%(10.33**) -239.3%(10.79**) -242.16%(9.71**) 
t+6 -257.89%(12.26**) -258.76%(11.04**) -258.9%(13.5**) 
t+12 -270.28%(10.04**) -270.25%(10.37**) -270.3%(9.94**) 
t+18 -243.89%(10.07**) -243.99%(10.02**) -243.7%(9.64**) 
t+24 -230.05%(12.33**) -231.33%(12.37**) -231.4%(11.54**) 
t+30 -156.35%(12.82**) -157.21%(13.64**) -157.59%(12.60**) 
t+36 -126.83%(10.25**) -126.51%(10.98**) -126.71%(10.85**) 
This table reports the Operating Performance of the M&A companies which is measured as the difference M&A 
companies and matching portfolio based on industry, size and book to market ratio. Statistical significance is 
determined by calculating Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test that tests the null hypotheses that the samples are drawn 
from the same distribution. Statistical significance are reported in the parentheses 
*indicates significance at 5% 
** indicates significance at 1% 
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